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 1 
Summary 
In his theory of the precariat Guy Standing gives his view on the current 
labour market where more and more people has precarious working 
situations. According to him it is the consequence of a policy that has seen 
movability on the labour market as the answer to economical problems. At 
troubled times the politicians have weakened the unions and worsened the 
employment securities for the workers. The labour market has also been 
affected by the fact that more and more people are working in another 
country than their own. The migrants are often both a cause to the growing 
of the precariat, and those in it that are mostly affected by the consequences. 
Since the unemployment is high in many countries, the migrants often come 
to countries where there is a lack of jobs. In that way they contribute to 
wage competition. 
 
In Sweden the unions have kept the wage competition in check by using 
collective action to make companies sign collective agreements. In 2004 
Byggnads, the union for construction workers, used a blockade to try to 
force the Latvian construction company Laval un Partneri to sign a 
collective agreement. Laval claimed that this was against the rules of 
collective peace since they had already signed a collective agreement in 
Latvia, and brought the case to the labour court. The labour court requested 
a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice, which agreed with 
Laval and stated that it is discriminatory if the unions can use collective 
action against foreign companies that has existing collective agreements. 
 
Sweden was forced to change their legislation. The new legislation states 
that if a foreign company that is posting workers in Sweden live up to the 
minimum employment conditions in Sweden, it is unlawful for the unions to 
take action against them. 
 
The effect of the legislation has been that the Swedish labour market now is 
open to wage competition. It has also meant that the unions have been 
weakened towards the foreign companies posting workers in Sweden. There 
is a proposed change in the legislation of a strict responsibility for all 
workers of sub-contractors. There is also a proposal regarding better access 
to information for foreign companies on employment conditions. 
 
The research question of the thesis is if Lex Laval contributes to the creation 
of a precariat and, if that is the case, the proposed changes can reverse the 
trend. The conclusion in the thesis is that Lex Laval favours economic 
interests over rights on the labour market, weakens the unions, open up for 
an unhealthy competition between workers and treat foreign workers as 
second-class workers. All this contributes to the growing of the precariat 
and the question must therefore be answered positive. The proposed 
legislative changes might improve this, but are not enough to reverse the 
trend. 
 2 
Sammanfattning 
I sin teori om prekariatet ger Guy Standing sin syn på den rådande 
arbetsmarknaden där fler och fler människor lever under osäkra 
arbetsförhållanden. Enligt honom är det konsekvenserna av en politik som 
har sett rörlighet på marknaden som svaret på ekonomiska problem. Vid 
problem har politikerna försvagat de kollektiva organisationerna och 
försämrat anställningstrygghet med mera för arbetstagarna. 
Arbetsmarknaden har också påverkats mycket av att allt fler människor 
jobbar någon annanstans än i sina hemländer. Migranterna är ofta både en 
del av orsaken till prekariatet och de i prekariatet som får känna av 
konsekvenserna som mest. Eftersom arbetslösheten är hög i de flesta länder 
kommer migranterna ofta till länder där det saknas jobb. De bidrar på så sätt 
till lönekonkurrensen.  
 
I Sverige har fackförbunden sett till att lönekonkurrensen har hållits nere 
genom att driva igenom kollektivavtal med stridsåtgärder. 2004 försökte 
Byggnads genom en blockad tvinga fram kollektivavtal med det lettiska 
byggföretaget Laval un Partneri. Laval ansåg att det rådde fredsplikt då de 
redan var bundna av ett kollektivavtal i Lettland och bestred 
stridsåtgärderna. Arbetsdomstolen begärde in ett förhandsavgörande från 
EU-domstolen som gick på Lavals linje. Domstolen fastslog att det är 
diskriminerande att fackförbund får vidta stridsåtgärden gentemot utländska 
företag som redan har kollektivavtal. 
 
Sverige tvingades således att ändra sin lagstiftning. Den nya lagstiftningen 
innebar att om företag som utstationerar arbetskraft tillämpar villkor som är 
lika förmånliga som minimi-kraven i Sverige råder det fredsplikt. 
 
Effekten av lagstiftningen har blivit att den svenska arbetsmarknaden är 
öppen för lönekonkurrens. Det har också inneburit att fackförbunden blivit 
rejält försvagade i förhållande till utländska företag som utstationerar 
arbetskraft i Sverige. Lagförslag finns om att införa ett strikt 
entreprenörsansvar för arbetstagare hos samtliga underentreprenörer, samt 
en förbättrad information om de svenska förhållandena till utländska företag 
som vill etablera sig i Sverige. 
 
Frågeställningen för uppsatsen är om Lex Laval bidrar till skapandet av ett 
prekariat och, om så är fallet, om de nya lagförslagen ändrar på detta. 
Slutsatsen i uppsatsen är att Lex Laval främjar ekonomiska intressen före 
rättigheter på arbetsmarknaden, försvagar fackförbunden, öppnar för osund 
konkurrens mellan arbetstagare och behandlar utländska arbetare som andra 
klassens arbetare. Allt detta bidrar till prekariatet och frågan måste därför 
besvaras jakande. Lagförslagen kan förbättra detta, men räcker inte för att 
vända trenden.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background information 
Early in November of 2014 the news in Sweden were dominated by a 
construction-site accident in Stockholm. Two workers had lost their lives 
and another was seriously injured. The two dead workers were, not 
unexpectedly, not Swedish citizens. The situation for foreign workers in the 
construction sector in Sweden has been widely debated ever since the 
creation of Lex Laval, a legislation that hinders the unions to use collective 
action in order to force foreign companies to sign collective agreements. 
The two workers were not covered by any collective agreement, since their 
employer had not signed any such agreement. Only six months earlier the 
Swedish public service television aired the documentary The unswedish 
model in which they painted a grim picture of the Swedish construction 
sector. In the documentary they proved that posted workers were working 
for a fragment of wage of the Swedish workers and by this outrivaled the 
Swedish workers1. Once again the debate about Lex Laval and the situation 
for posted workers in Sweden gained momentum.  
 
The Lex Laval legislation did not appear in a vacuum, it was created due to 
the outcome of a case against Sweden in the European Court of Justice. But 
the legislation was also created in the wake of the global financial crisis in 
2008. The legislation cannot be viewed and analysed without having the 
current economical and political landscape in mind. In the theory of the 
Precariat Guy Standing presents his views on the labour market, the political 
landscape and on the result of these policies. Standing states that the 
political agenda combined with the globalisation has resulted in a new class 
emerging, the Precariat. The Precariat is recognised by the lack of certain 
securities and by working in precarious employments. Sweden is no 
exception from that trend, today 17% of those in employment have 
temporary employments, which is an increase from 11% in the beginning of 
the 90’s2. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Lex Laval legislation from a 
Precariat point of view. I will apply Standings theory on the background to, 
and reasoning behind, the legislation, the effects and the suggested changes 
of it.  
 
                                                
1 Den osvenska modellen, SVT, aired 5th June, 2014. [available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_L2pBsBHsc] 
2 Statistics Sweden, Trends for persons in temporary employment, AM 110 SM 1501, 2015, 
p 1. 
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The research question for this thesis is:  
Does Lex Laval contribute to the creation of a precariat?  
 
With the sub questions: 
What are the reasons behind the legislation? 
What consequences has the legislation had? 
If Lex Laval contributes to the creation of a precariat, will the proposed 
changes reverse this? 
1.3 Disposition and Delimitations 
The overall outline of this thesis is that the theory used is presented in 
chapter 2, in chapter 3 the factual circumstances are described and analysed 
and chapter 4 is the conclusion. 
 
In the theory chapter I will begin with an overview of what the precariat is 
and then focus on the aspect of migrant workers’3 role in the precariat. I will 
also present the vision Standing has for the future regarding the precariat. 
 
In the third chapter I will firstly present the circumstances and the outcome 
of the Laval-case, then the new legislation, the effects of the legislation on 
the Swedish labour market and lastly I will present the proposed changes to 
the Lex Laval legislation. Each section will end with an analysis. 
 
Lex Laval can be, and have been, looked at from many different 
perspectives, asking different questions. Such perspectives could be an on 
the ground case study of the effects of the legislation or a comparison 
between the EU law and the Swedish law. These aspects have been covered 
in reports from the parties of the labour market and in the preparatory works 
for the Swedish legislation. This thesis will focus on the underlying reasons 
for the legislation from a precariat point of view. The effects and the 
coherence with EU law will only be discussed insofar it relates to the theory 
of the precariat. 
 
There are also many other interesting aspects of Standing’s theory that are 
relevant for the Swedish society today, such as the role of the private 
employment agencies and how we organise our social-welfare system. 
These topics will be mentioned in the theory chapter, but the focus of the 
analysis will be the role of and situation for the migrant workers, and the 
balance between the different interests on the labour market. 
1.4 Methodology and Material 
In the theory chapter I have studied Guy Standing’s theory of the precariat, 
which he has presented in his two latest books.  
                                                
3 In this thesis I will use Standing’s definition of ”migrant workers” which is everyone that 
for one reason or another work in a country other than their own. 
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For the third chapter I have used the traditional legal method to examine the 
established law, which means that I have looked at legislation, case law and 
the preparatory works from both Sweden and the EU. For the section that 
covers the effects of the legislation I have used reports produced by the 
unions and the employers’ organisations. For the analyses I have applied the 
theory presented in chapter two on the material in each section. 
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2 Theory of the Precariat 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2011 Guy Standing published the book “The Precariat – the new 
dangerous class” (The Precariat). Standing is a former Director of the Socio-
Economic Security Programme at ILO, current Professor of Development 
Studies at University of London and founder of the Basic Income Earth 
Network, an organisation that promotes basic income.4 
 
In The Precariat Standing argues that the Neo-Liberal politics of the last 
three or four decades have resulted in the emergence of a new class, which 
Standing calls the precariat. He states that the basis of Neo-Liberal politics 
is flexibility, so that the labour force can be used when and where it is 
needed. Combined with globalisation this means that governments started 
competing with each other to make the labour market more flexible and be 
more attractive to companies. More and more of the employees now find 
themselves in unsecure, precarious, forms of employment. This 
distinguishes them from the proletariat and gives them special political 
interests and needs. According to Standing the precariat is not yet a class in 
itself, but one in the making.5 
 
In this chapter I will present Guy Standings theory of the precariat that he 
has laid down in his two books, The Precariat and “A Precariat Charter – 
from denizens to citizens” (A Precariat Charter). I will use this theory to 
analyse Lex Laval. I will not cover all aspects of the theory, but will focus 
on the migrant workers after a descriptive overview. 
 
Just like all other theories, Standing’s theory of the precariat does not give 
the whole picture or hold all the answers. And of course it is not un-
challenged6, but I still think it is a theory that has some worth. The reason is 
that I think it can highlight interesting aspects of, and reasons behind, the 
Lex Laval legislation. 
 
2.2 What is the Precariat? 
2.2.1 The Seven Insecurities 
The term precariat is a combination of two words. One is precarious, which 
has synonyms such as unstable, insecure and unsettled. The other word is 
                                                
4 http://www.guystanding.com/resume 
5 Standing, Guy, The Precariat: the new dangerous class, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 
2011, pp. 8-11. [cited as: Standing (2011)] 
6 See for example, Seymour, Richard, We are all precarious – on the concept of the 
’precariat’ and its misuses, New Left Project. 2012. 
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proletariat, which is a term used for the workers whose only asset is the 
amount of work they can perform.7 This sums up the unifying 
characteristics of the precariat, a group that otherwise have many different 
faces, ranging from highly educated persons that are only able to get 
temporary jobs or jobs below their level of education, to migrants trying to 
get into the labour market at all.8 
 
One can ask oneself why there is a need to define a new class, if this is not 
simply crossing the river to get water9, why can the precariat not be seen as 
a part of the working class and the labour movement? The reason, according 
to Standing is that the labour movement consisted mainly of labourers, that 
is, individuals that were employed in stable long-term jobs. Their struggle 
was that their standard of work and living was not satisfactory and they 
wanted to improve it. They fought for more influence, more pay, more spare 
time and safer workplaces, this can be seen by looking at the early 
conventions from ILO that consist mainly of conventions regarding areas 
such as freedom of association, working hours, workplace safety and 
minimum wages.10 Standing states that the difference between the labour 
movement and the working class on the one hand and the members of the 
precariat on the other is that the latter lack important securities that the 
working class had. Standing identifies seven such rights that are not 
available to the precariat: 11 
 
Labour market security – Opportunity to earn an income, backed up by a 
political aim of “full employment” 
Employment Security – A security to keep a job and a protection against 
losing it arbitrarily  
Job Security – The possibility to “retain a niche” and to make a career in 
that niche. The security not to be thrown around different jobs within the 
same employment. 
Work security – Protection against, and compensation for, accidents at the 
workplace. Also regulations of working hours. 
Skill reproduction security – The possibility to develop at a job through 
employment training and to put these skills into use. 
Income security – The assurance of a steady income that is protected by 
minimum wages and political aims to have a social security that reduces 
income inequality 
Representation security – The possibility to make themselves heard in a 
collective way through trade unions and the right to strike. 12 
 
                                                
7 Standing (2011), p 11. 
8 Standing (2011), p 22. 
9 Swedish Proverb 
10 http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm [accessed May 26th 
2015] 
11 Standing (2011), pp 16-17. 
12 Standing (2011), p 17. 
 10 
Standing later developed the class characteristics in A Precariat Charter 
where he said that there were ten things that distinguished the precariat as a 
class.  
 
Firstly there is a new norm on the labour market today. The old norm was 
long-term stable jobs, and most labour protection was constructed around 
that. The precariat faces a new norm of uncertain and volatile labour.  
Secondly the precariat, due to the uncertain nature of their employments, do 
not benefit from non-wage remuneration, such as paid vacation, medical 
leave and parental leave.  
Thirdly the precariat has a different relation to the state than, for example, 
the traditional working class. Being precarious also means being in a state of 
dependence, mainly towards the state. The precariousness of their work 
makes the precariat dependant on benefits. The precariat is a necessity in the 
globalised neo-liberal world, but still they are being criticised for not being 
in employment. To receive benefits they are subjected to various forms of 
tests and might have to give up some of their freedoms (for example, they 
can be forced to take jobs far away from where they are living).  
Fourthly the precariat lacks an occupational identity. Moving from job to 
job, even between sectors the precariat lacks the comfort of having a clear 
view of their career.  
Fifthly the precariat lacks control of their time. New forms of working and 
employment, such as zero hour contracts and the possibility to work from 
home means that they are expected to always be prepared to work. The 
members of the proletariat usually have the day divided into clear segments, 
work time and leisure time. For many the division is not so clear today and 
especially so for the precariat. The precariat also do a lot of work for labour, 
as Standing calls it. Meaning that they have to spend more time than 
someone in a long-term job to apply for jobs and keep their knowledge and 
skills attractive on the labour market. This is something that takes up their 
time, but they are not compensated for it.  
Sixthly the precariat members are more detached from the labour they are 
doing since they are doing so much different labour. This is not only a bad 
thing, it can be liberating not to search for fulfilment through labour, but it 
is a characteristic for the precariat nonetheless.  
Seventhly the precariat has less possibility for upwards social mobility 
since it has lessened during the globalisation era.  
Eighthly due to the massive increase and commodification of education 
more workers than ever are over qualified for their job.  
Ninthly the precariat is not covered by the traditional labour rights since 
they were acquired by and designed for the proletariat. Standing criticises 
these rights for not being rights at all since they were always conditional. 
They were constructed around the fact that most were in stable employment 
and the risk for a falling out could be calculated and treated as an insurance. 
The members of the precariat do not have the luxury of foreseeable 
problems. Therefore the protection and securities that worked for the 
proletariat do not apply in the same way to the precariat. This means they 
are in a more insecure position.  
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Tenthly the precariat is facing precarity and poverty traps. The welfare 
state, Standing argues, was built for the proletariat, with insurances paid for 
by regular contributions from stable work, which kicked in if someone was 
unfortunate enough to, for example, be out of a job. Now that more and 
more workers are not in stable jobs and thus can contribute less to, and need 
more, benefits this system does not work any more. Instead the system is 
based on means testing to see who is in a bad enough situation, but at the 
same time, worthy to receive benefits. One problem with this system is that 
if someone receives benefits the person will lose them if he or she gets a 
job. This could mean that the person is “taxed” 100% for the work. This 
taken together with the fact that if this person takes a short term job, he or 
she will have to start the whole process to apply for benefits over again 
when the employment ends, means there is no incentive to work since the 
position is worsened. The government therefore needs to start punishing 
people to create an incentive to work, forcing unemployed to take any job 
by threatening to take benefits away otherwise. The precariat is thus forced 
to take short term, low paid and unqualified jobs, which traps them in 
precarity. These ten features are what defines the precariat according to 
Standing, not all of the features are unique to the precariat but they define 
this “class in the making” taken together.13 
 
The reason that there is a precariat is that it is the logical consequence of 
globalisation combined with the neo-liberal politics that took shape and 
gained influence through Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The root 
of the school of thought is the analysis made by some economists that if the 
market and capital in Europe was not allowed to flow freely, the cost of 
labour would increase and in the end companies would move abroad. This 
would lead to vast unemployment, increased poverty and a slow down of 
economic growth. Their solution was to make the labour market more 
flexible. The flexibility was designed to make it easier for the employers to 
adjust number of employees, their salaries and their tasks. This, of course, 
led to more and more workers having more insecure jobs and a more 
insecure income. According to Standing the effects of the neo-liberal 
politics was increased due to the fact that the social democrat politicians 
bought into it as well and therefore did not contest it.14 
 
So far the precariat has not had much of a political influence, but some 
groups of the precariat have already made themselves heard. Through 
occupations and marches such as alternative May Day parades, the 
EuroMayDay that is taking place all over Europe and gathers hundreds of 
thousands participators. The movement still lacks political direction though, 
thus the limited influence.15 
 
                                                
13 Standing, Guy, A Precariat Charter: From denizens to citizens, London, Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014, pp 16-28. [cited as Standing (2014)] 
14 Standing (2011), pp 8-9.  
15 Standing (2011), pp 2-5. 
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2.2.2 Why is the precariat growing? 
The reason that the precariat is growing is that it is a consequence of the 
globalisation, which according to Standing lasted from 1975-2008, and the 
role it has played in the structure of societies during that time. The essence 
of the policies in that time has been a commodification of everything. In a 
neo-liberal economy the aim is to have a “global market economy based on 
competitiveness and individualism”16. In such an economy everything is 
said to have a value in accordance with supply and demand and everything 
that hinders that, such as trade unions and guilds, needs to be changed or 
removed. 17 
 
One reason for the growing of the precariat is the fact that the world simply 
is more global today. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the opening up of 
China and India entering the global market as well, taken together with 
cheaper and more efficient transportation has meant that 1,5 billion workers 
have joined the global workforce in the last 25 years. This was doubling the 
size of the workforce, and the “new” workers came from countries where 
the wage level was a fraction of that in the western world. This resulted in 
mass outsourcing to these countries, which has affected the work force in 
the rest of the world.18 
 
As mentioned above, one of the securities that the precariat lack is 
employment security. The neo-liberal view of the workforce is that it needs 
to be flexible. The argument is that this would create more jobs since 
companies can hire workers without it being such a big commitment. The 
result has been a market that, backed up by financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the world bank, is shifting from stable jobs with high security to 
temporary jobs facilitated by temporary workers agencies to make it easier 
to hire short term. During the financial crisis in 2008 companies had to let a 
lot of workers go. These have not been re-hired, but instead the companies 
have turned to hiring temporary workers. According to Standing the shift 
have been accepted by the unions who made sure the regular workers kept 
their security but opened up for temporary workers that would take the fall 
in times of trouble.19 
 
2.2.3 Denizens 
Citizenship is a pre-requisite for the possibility to enjoy many of the human 
rights. As an example, the right to vote (maybe the prime way of exercising 
a political right) is in most cases closely tied to being a citizen20. The right 
to remain on a certain piece of land is also tied to citizenship or at least 
                                                
16 Standing (2011), p 43. 
17 Standing (2011), pp 43-45. 
18 Standing (2011), pp 46-49. 
19 Standing (2011), pp 53-61. 
20 As an example Article 16 of the European Convention on Human Rights restricts the 
applicability of the political rights of the convention towards aliens. 
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“lawfully residing” in a country21. In the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) there is a right to emigrate22, but not a right to immigrate. 
Standing argues that today not only migrants become denizens but citizens 
also lose rights that traditionally are tied to the citizenship. This is an 
interesting and important part of the theory of the precariat, but this thesis is 
focused on migrant workers and I will instead focus on the parts that 
concern migrants and the fact that the increased globalisation means that 
more and more people lack access to many rights where they reside.23  
 
The concept of denizens is an old one; it was used in the Middle Ages in 
England, describing a person in a middle stage between alien and natural 
born citizen. The denizen usually had economic rights but lacked political 
ones. The concept of denizens was re-introduced in the early 90’s, now 
meaning a person that was on her way, making progress, to become a real 
citizen. Today the concept is not only one of aliens becoming citizens but 
one of members of a society that has different levels of access to rights. 
According to Standing it is no longer only a progress from alien towards 
citizen to gain more rights, but also a regress, moving from citizen to 
denizen by losing rights. There are several ways that citizens can lose rights, 
for example changes in law can take rights away, as well as the change of 
status of an individual, such as becoming unemployed. It is important to 
note that a right does not have to be taken away de jure but can also be 
taken away de facto by removing, or not providing, the possibility to attain 
it. Standing argues that neo-liberalism has created a society with different 
levels, with different amount of rights on each level.24 
2.2.4 The role of migrants in the precariat 
The number of migrants has grown rapidly since the mid 20th century when 
globalisation spread and some closed economies, such as soviet and china, 
opened up more.25 
 
Migrants play a big role in the growing of the precariat. They are one of the 
reasons for the growth of the precariat and they are also those in the 
precariat that suffer most and are being blamed for problems that they are 
not the primary reason for. Of course not all migrants face the same 
problems. Standing lists seven different categories of migrants that have 
quite different features. Ranging from undocumented migrants and refugees 
to students and in-corporation migrants26. The traditional migrant, according 
to Standing, is an individual that moves from one country to another and 
then settles there. With the growth of globalisation with, for example, the 
                                                
21 European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol no. 4, Article 2.1. 
22 European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol no. 4, Article 2.2. 
23 Standing, Guy, A Precariat Charter: From denizens to citizens, London, Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014, pp 2-5. 
24 Standing (2014), pp 7-10. 
25 Standing (2011), pp 153-154. 
26 Those that are working in a company and are being deployed abroad for the same 
company for a period of time. 
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free movement within the inner market of the European Union (EU) the idea 
of the settler migrant needs to be complemented with the seasonal or 
circular migrant that for a period of time moves from one country to 
another, often to take a temporary job to bring money home, and then 
returns to the country of origin again. These seasonal migrants will be the 
focus of this thesis.27 
 
“Many other migrants, despite being legal, are left vulnerable to such 
an extent that any dispassionate observer would be led to wonder 
whether it is not deliberate, to please some local interests, to placate 
local workers or because they have no political rights and cannot 
vote.”28 
 
2.2.4.1 How do Migrants fuel the precariat 
Standing calls the precariat the “floating reserve” meaning that they can be 
called in whenever and wherever. According to Standing the politicians in 
many places have tried to curb the amount of foreign labourers to benefit 
their own citizens, but they have been opposed by businesses. The 
businesses want to be able to hire migrant workers since it is much cheaper 
than to hire local workers.29 
 
The seasonal migrant workers affect the whole precariat. They come from 
poorer countries where the situation is worse than in the country they arrive 
to. They are used to lower wages and worse circumstances. In a society 
where flexibility is the main policy of the labour market the workers will 
have to compete with each other by lowering their standard of employment 
conditions. Needing less is an advantage in such a society, which means that 
seasonal migrant workers are “better off” since they do not have the same 
expenses in their home country. This means that the migrant workers accept 
lower standards and in turn push down the standard for everyone. Standing 
does not mean to blame migrant workers for this. He means that this is a 
structural problem that is wanted by, and a result of, the neo-liberal politics 
in combination with globalisation. The migrant worker is always a denizen, 
they have limited or no political voice. Instead they try to keep their head 
down and go under the radar to avoid being sent home. The risk of being 
sent home is major disadvantage for migrant workers compared to the 
citizens who have no such fear of being expelled.30 
 
The Neo-Liberal policies often create an us vs. them situation. Since the 
flexible system encourages competition for the jobs available the working 
class becomes critical of the migrant workers that come in and “take their 
jobs”. According to Standing this is not true, what to blame is the policies. It 
would be better for the two groups to unite instead of antagonising each 
other. The tax system that makes the workers feel they are paying the bill 
                                                
27 Standing (2011), pp 153-159. 
28 Standing (2011), p 168. 
29 Standing (2011), pp 174-176. 
30 Standing (2011), pp 192-195. 
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for the migrants is also a contributing factor of the dividing into groups. 
Standing says this is a sign of a society where empathy is declining. The 
result is a society that portraits immigrants as an unwanted part, fuelled by 
populist politicians.31  
 
2.3 What will happen? 
2.3.1 If nothing changes 
For Standing the worst-case scenario is that the Neo-Liberal politics will 
continue to be given free reign. What he sees in the future is a society where 
the individualism increases which in turn leads to a “demonization” of those 
who struggle and picture them as misfits or villains. According to him we 
can already see this happen in that social security more and more turns in to 
a test based benefit system where the poor and unemployed have to prove 
that they are not lazy and are worthy of a certain benefits by, for example, 
applying to a certain number of jobs, no matter the standard or the location 
of those jobs. The control and surveillance of those in a situation of need is 
increasing through such means. Standing states that this is a first step 
towards what Jeremy Bentham described as the panopitcon prison. A prison 
where one guard in the middle of a round prison can see all the prisoners, 
but they can not see the guard, thus not knowing when they are being 
watched and not. They are therefore always, out of fear, forced to behave in 
a certain way. If they are not, some of their privileges will be decreased. 
They are also to be kept apart because of their possibility to form a 
collective mind. Standing means that this is also something that is 
significant for the society today, the collective bodies such as guilds and the 
unions are being dismantled and their powers are being limited. In a society 
that rewards individualism and “survival of the fittest” there is no room for 
collective organs that hinder it. In the panopticon prison the prisoners are 
made to behave in a certain way, if not they are being punished. They are 
given the illusion of free behaviour but in the end there is no real choice, 
instead they are being guided through different negative effects that would 
happen to them if they were to oppose it.32 
 
2.3.2 Standing’s solutions 
When looking at the solutions proposed by Standing it must be remembered 
that he is the co-founder and honorary president of the Basic Income Earth 
Network. His main solution is a completely new social security system 
based on basic income, which is a sum of money paid out to everyone in a 
society regardless of job or family situation. The idea is that this will 
liberate individuals to strive for what they really want, to plan for their 
                                                
31 Standing (2011), pp 192-195. 
32 Standing (2011), pp 227-229, 246-251. 
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future, to be able to take risks and still have a basic security.33 I will not go 
much into this since it is too big of a solution for the problem that I am 
focusing on in this thesis. Instead I will focus on proposals that would have 
a more immediate effect for the migrant workers in Sweden. 
 
Standing is opposed to what he calls “labourism”, meaning that we are too 
focused on labour, which he describes as “work done for bosses, in 
subservience, in master-slave relations”34. The alternative would be having a 
more inclusive definition of work, which also would include all work that is 
not “labour” such as taking care of a relative, staying home with kids or 
engaging in voluntary work. Standing argues that before the 20th century 
such work was valued in the same way as labour was and that we should 
shift again to such a view of work.35 These are all interesting ideas, but do 
fall outside of the scope in this thesis. It is more concerned with broader 
political schemes and statistics, the migrant workers work in the traditional 
sphere of labour.  
 
An idea that Standing brings up that is highly relevant to this thesis, and for 
the migrant workers, is that the precariat in general and especially the 
migrants needs representation through state legitimised and funded agencies 
that can represent them. 36This is of course nothing new, but Standing 
means that the traditional unions probably cannot play this role. The reason 
for this is that the function of the unions is to represent their members, 
which means saving jobs and giving those in stable labour a bigger share of 
the production outcome. This is out-dated, since there today is a lot of 
flexibility, whether the union wants it or not. The new form of association 
organising and representing the precariat needs to be able to consider all the 
work and labour that the precariat undertakes. It needs to be able to bargain 
with government, employers and the unions (since they do not have the 
same interests). This new kind of association also has to be able to speak for 
the precariat in questions regarding its position and possibilities in political 
matters. Standing means that they need to have a Voice (capital v in voice is 
used by standing throughout his books) inside policy agencies.37  
 
“Freedom comes from being part of a community in which to realise 
freedom in the exercise of it. […] The precariat is free in the neo-
liberal sense, free to compete against each other, to consume and to 
labour. It is not free in that there is no associational structure in 
which the paternalists can be rebuffed or the oppressive competitive 
drive held in check”38 
 
Standing says there are four ways for the unions to handle the situation with 
“atypical” workers such as temporary migrant workers. They can exclude 
them, subordinate them in relation to their other members’ interests, include 
                                                
33 Standing (2011), pp 295-299. 
34 Standing (2014), pp 11-12. 
35 Standing (2014), pp 11-12. 
36 Standing (2011), p 272. 
37 Standing (2011), pp. 288-293 
38 Standing (2011), p 288. 
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them in their overall agenda or actively engage in their issues. Standing here 
admits that there has been a trend towards the active engagement in their 
issues, but withholds that there are countries where no interest has been 
shown at all.39  
 
Overall Standing is against any form of subsidies, but in the case of 
representation unions should receive exactly the same amount that is given 
to the corporations and the financial capital. The justification of such a 
subsidy is that the aim would be to achieve equality in bargaining and in the 
representation of worker interest. The equality is already being undermined 
says Standing and refers to a situation in the United Kingdom where the 
right to strike is under attack by a proposal to remove tax credits for those 
who partake in a strike, a de facto removal of the right to strike.40 
 
When referring to a new kind of association for the precariat he exemplifies 
this with a few associations around the world that is working in a new way. 
There are organisations that organise the precariat not as a union but to 
arrange different actions and to be a voice towards government. There are 
organisations that focus on providing services for the precariat, such as 
pensions and medical insurance. A Jamaican organisation that organises the 
domestic workers is not negotiating directly with employers but only with 
employer’s federations and also with the government. In mentioning this 
union he also says that ILO convention 189, although not ratified by 
Jamaica, has made it easier to put pressure on its’ counterparts. 41 
 
2.3.3 The situation for the migrants  
Standing dedicates a good deal of his books to the situation for migrants. 
This includes not only migrant workers, but also all kind of migrants that for 
some reason have left their home and resides somewhere else, permanently 
or temporarily. In many places in Europe today the nationalistic parties have 
had great successes. Standing rebukes their arguments saying they are only 
built on prejudices. First of all migrants are still in minority everywhere, in 
OECD countries the average is 13% migrants. Secondly, having a high 
share of migrants is related to economic success, not high unemployment 
and low growth. He takes Italy as an example, stating that with the low birth 
rate the country would have collapsed economically without migrants,42 
since the population would have been too small and old to keep it running.43 
 
When talking about rights for migrants, Standing states that as long as there 
are nations there will be differences in rights for citizens and migrants. 
However, that does not mean all differences should be accepted. Two rights 
                                                
39 Standing (2014), 2014, p 180. 
40 Standing (2014)2014, p 180. 
41 Standing (2014), pp 181, 186-189. 
42 The same has been argued for in regard to Sweden by the Think Tank “Global 
Utmaning”. See: http://www.dn.se/debatt/ingen-valfard-utan-invandring/  
43 Standing (2014), p. 198. 
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that Standing specifically points out is the right of access to law and due 
process, and political rights. Migrants often have de jure or de facto hinder 
to exercise their right to access to court. This is a very important right to 
have, since without it, it is impossible to realise all other rights. The lack of 
political rights, such as voting and standing for political office, means that 
migrants are in a much weaker position to make themselves heard and to 
have influence over their situation. Migrants must in the most possible way 
be entitled to and have access to the same rights as citizens. Especially since 
the numbers of migrants in the world is higher than ever before.44 
 
Standing states that migrant labourers need to be treated as equals on the 
labour market. He exemplifies the problem with migrant workers not being 
treated in the same way as national workers by referring to proposals in the 
UK that companies with more than 25% foreign workers should report this 
to the government and that employment agencies should not be allowed to 
supply workers from one country only. According to Standing the idea 
behind this was to make it harder for the migrants to enter the market and 
thus treating them as second-class workers.45 
 
 
                                                
44 Standing (2014), pp 200-204. 
45 Standing (2014), pp 209-210. 
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3 Lex Laval legislation 
3.1 EU and Free Movement of Services 
3.1.1 Article 49 and 50 EC 
The free movement of goods and services is one of the foundations of the 
European Union. The free movement of services was at the time of the 
Laval-case regulated in Article 49 and Article 50 in the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (EC). The articles state that restrictions on the 
freedom for nationals to provide services in other member states are 
prohibited. The national does not have to be an individual but can be a 
company as well.46 
 
3.1.2 The Posting of Workers Directive 
One of the major aims of the European Union is to create an inner market 
where goods and services can be provided across boarders and where there 
is no discrimination based on citizenship in a member state other than the 
one where a company or person resides. One area that was in need of 
regulation for this aim to be fulfilled was the posting of workers in another 
member state. This was dealt by, in the Posting of Workers Directive47. In 
the reasoning for the adoption of the directive the parliament and the council 
of the European Union states that in order to promote transnational posting 
it is important to promote fair competition and the rights of workers. The 
aim of the directive is to do this by creating a nucleus of minimum rights 
that are common for all member states. These rights should not be a hinder 
for employment terms and conditions that are more favourable for the 
worker. Neither is the Posting of Workers Directive supposed to affect the 
law of the member states concerning the right to take collective action to 
protect interests of trades and professions.48  
 
The Posting of Workers Directive is applicable to cases of transnational 
posting of workers for a limited amount of time. The directive says that 
member states shall ensure that companies that are posting workers within 
their territory guarantees them the rights they have in the host country. Not 
all the rights though, only on seven different areas, for example maximum 
working hours, minimum wages and safety and health at the workplace. The 
rights, which shall be followed, can be regulated in different ways; it can be 
through law or through universally applicable collective agreements. The 
                                                
46 Conosolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 49 & 50, 
2006 O.J. C 321 E/37. 
47 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. (Posting of 
Workers Directive) 
48 Posting of Workers Directive, Pp 1-2. 
 20 
collective agreements have to have been declared universally applicable. 
The directive does, thus, not set a specific, for example, minimum wage, but 
rather it states that all posted workers shall have the right to the minimum 
wage in the host country, whatever it is.49 
 
To make it easier for the companies to establish in another member state the 
member states have to set up an office to communicate with other member 
states. These offices shall make sure the employment terms and conditions 
that the workers have the right to are accessible to the public. The member 
states shall also make sure there is a way for workers to have access these 
rights.50 
 
3.1.2.1 The Economic and Social Committee’s opinon 
on the proposal 
The Economic and Social Committee was consulted on the proposal to the 
Directive. One of the comments was that the fundamental aim of the 
Directive is unclear. It is said to be a directive that aims to promote fair 
competition, but many of the clauses are related to protection for workers. 
 
Another comment from the Economic and Social Committee was that there 
should be a social clause included in the contracts. The social clause would 
prescribe a dual responsibility for both the employer and the principal that 
contracts the employer.51 
 
3.1.3 Analysis 
From a Precariat point of view the Posting of Workers Directive was a good 
one. It laid down a foundation of rules that were to be followed in every 
member state. These rules were not qualitative, laying down the exact 
regulations, but instead said what rules, as a minimum, would apply in the 
same way to posted workers as it did to the national workers. This is good 
since it would mean that the competition between the national workers and 
the posted workers would not be based on which group would be able to 
“sell out” their rights in the most extensive way.  
 
The European Social Committee critiqued the directive for having unclear 
motives, since the main motive is the free movement of services but it 
contained several provisions on the right for workers. From a precariat point 
of view there is no need for critique against this. One of the critiques in the 
theory of the precariat is that in the era of the neo-liberalism economy has 
always taken the front seat and the workers’ rights have been squeezed in in 
the back seat. This directive seems to have a different approach by 
                                                
49 Posting of Workers Directive, Articles 1-3. 
50 Posting of Workers Directive, Articles 4-5. 
51 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services (92/C 49/12) 
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incorporating workers rights in a directive with the focus to create an inner 
market with free movement of services. 
 
It is also a directive that aims to protect workers in a country other than 
where they are citizens by saying that they should not have fewer rights than 
the locals on certain areas. In that sense they are creating a floor of rights to 
stand on for the posted workers. It also opens up for the possibility of more 
rights than those in the directive. The migrants are thus not treated as 
second-class citizens. The directive emphasizes that it should not affect the 
national laws regarding the right to take collective action to defend 
professional interests, which seems to mean that the directive should not 
lessen the influence of the unions. 
 
3.2 The Laval case 
3.2.1 What happened 
The Laval case started with a rebuilding of a school in the Swedish city of 
Vaxholm in the summer of 2004. The city of Vaxholm hired the Latvian 
company Laval un Partnieri (Laval) to do the rebuilding, one of the 
conditions to win the contract was to have a collective agreement. 
Byggnads, the construction workers’ union, initiated negotiations with 
Laval requesting among other things that the workers should have a salary 
of 145 Swedish kronor (SEK). Laval did not want to pay more than 109 
SEK. In the end Laval decided to sign a collective agreement with a Latvian 
union instead of Byggnads and meant that this was enough to live up to the 
commitment to have a collective agreement. Byggnads opposed this and 
stated that Laval should have an agreement with a Swedish union so that the 
same rules can apply to the Latvian workers as to Swedish workers. 
Byggnads response was to notice Laval that they would take industrial 
action to push away the Latvian agreement and impose a Swedish one in its 
place. Laval on their turn stated that they had a collective agreement and 
that there was an obligation to maintain industrial peace.52 
 
In November 2004 Byggnads initiated industrial actions against the 
construction site in Vaxholm. The actions resulted in a complete stop of 
shipments to the construction site and therefore a complete stop of the 
construction. During the action by Byggnads their members shouted “go 
home” to the Latvian workers. This was seen as a sign of the racist and 
protectionist motives of the union and its members.53 
                                                
52 Petterson, Lars-Olof, Vitbok Laval – Vad hände egentligen i Vaxholm, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetarförbundet. 2012, p. 12-13. 
53 Petterson (2012), p. 13. 
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3.2.2 Swedish Courts 
3.2.2.1 Arbetsdomstolen (Labour Court) 
Laval brought the case before the Swedish Labour Court. First of all they 
wanted the court to make an interim decision, forcing Byggnads and the 
sympathising unions to cease their industrial actions against the company. 
The court rejected the request.54 
 
The Labour Court held its proceedings in the case in March 2005, at this 
point the Latvian workers had returned home and would not return to the 
workplace again. At this point there were sympathy strikes at all work sites 
where Laval was present, which meant that they could not perform work 
anywhere in Sweden and in the end of March the company was declared 
bankrupt.55 
 
In the Labour Court proceedings Laval claimed that this was a EU matter 
and that the court should request a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (the Court). The Labour Court agreed 
to this and sent the following two questions to the Court.56 
 
“'(1) Is it compatible with rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to 
provide services and the prohibition of any discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and with the provisions of Directive 96/71/EC 
... for trade unions to attempt, by means of collective action in the 
form of a blockade ("blockad"), to force a foreign provider of services 
to sign a collective agreement in the host country in respect of terms 
and conditions of employment, such as that described in the decision 
of the Arbetsdomstolen [of 29 April 2005 (collective agreement for the 
building sector)], if the situation in the host country is such that the 
legislation to implement Directive 96/71 has no express provisions 
concerning the application of terms and conditions of employment in 
collective agreements?  
(2) The [MBL] prohibits a trade union from taking collective action 
with the intention of circumventing a collective agreement concluded 
by other parties. That prohibition applies, however, pursuant to a 
special provision contained in part of the law known as the "Lex 
Britannia", only where a trade union takes collective action in 
relation to conditions of work to which the [MBL] is directly 
applicable, which means in practice that the prohibition is not 
applicable to collective action against a foreign undertaking which is 
temporarily active in Sweden and which brings its own workforce. Do 
the rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide services and the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and the 
provisions of Directive 96/71 preclude application of the latter rule — 
which, together with other parts of the Lex Britannia, mean in 
practice that Swedish collective agreements become applicable and 
take precedence over foreign collective agreements already concluded 
                                                
54 AD 2009 nr 89 p 5. 
55 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partnieri [2007] ECR I-11845, para 37-38. [cited as: Laval] 
56 AD 2009 nr 89, p. 5. 
 23 
— to collective action in the form of a blockade taken by Swedish 
trade unions against a foreign temporary provider of services in 
Sweden?' “57 
 
3.2.3 The EU Court 
It took almost three years before the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities gave a ruling in the case. The judgement was published 
December 18th in 2007. The Court reformulated the questions in the way 
that it understood them. They understood the first question as: 
 
Are Article 49 EC and directive 96/71 to be interpreted as precluding a 
trade union to use collective action to force a company from another 
EU-member state to pay wages at a certain level when there is no 
minimum wage in the country, and to force the company to sign a 
collective agreement that is more extensive than the provisions in 
Directive 96/71?58 
 
The second question was interpreted as follows: 
 
Is there a prohibition in article 49 EC and 50 EC for a country to have 
a legislation that states that collective action is prohibited when a 
company has signed a collective agreement, only when the collective 
agreement is signed with a national trade union?59 
 
3.2.3.1 First Question 
The Court answers the first question by starting with referring to the 
relevant rules. Article 49 EC and 50 EC states that restrictions on a national 
of a member state to establish in another member state are prohibited. This 
applies also to companies trying to establish in another member state.60 
 
There is no prohibition for states to extend parts of their legislation to apply 
to everyone that works on their territory. Which parts of their legislation that 
can be applicable for posted workers is formulated in the Posting of 
Workers Directive. This is only “to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules 
for minimum protection to be observed in the host country by employers 
who post workers there”61. Among other things the minimum wage level 
can be extended to apply to posted workers. In Sweden there is no such 
minimum wage legislation, the parties of the labour market, the unions and 
the employers instead negotiate the wage levels.62 
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58 Laval, para 53. 
59 Laval, para 112. 
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62 Laval, para 57. 
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The Posting of Workers Directive is open to other forms of deciding the 
minimum wage level than through legislation or other forms that are 
exemplified in the Directive, but these can only be used to decide the 
minimum level, not, as in this case, a higher level of pay that is requested by 
Byggnads.63 
 
The Court then proceeds by explaining the reason for the Posting of workers 
Directive, which is to make sure that there is a nucleus of mandatory 
protection on certain areas. The main reason for this is to ensure fair 
competition between companies that are stationed in different member 
states. The competition would be unfair if a company could apply its own 
country’s lower level of protection in another member state when posting 
workers there. Secondly the reason is to protect the workers.64  
 
The Court further states that the Posting of Workers Directive cannot be 
interpreted to mean that a state can have a wider range of mandatory 
protection than the directive minimum protection.65 
 
When it comes to the right to take collective action it is a right that is a 
legitimate interest that could justify restrictions in the free movement of 
services within the union. However, when imposing such restrictions, article 
49 EC has a direct effect on those imposing them. It is, thus, not enough to 
follow the national legislation but community law must also be followed.66 
 
The Swedish government stated that the actions in the case were justifiable 
since the aim was to protect the workers. The Court answered that such 
actions are justifiable, but only to the extent that it aims to impose the level 
that is laid down in the Posting of Workers Directive. The same is true for 
the right to take action to make sure the workers get paid enough, but again 
only to make the companies live up to the minimum wage decided in 
accordance with the directive.67 
 
In the present case the collective action, the blockade, was used to try to 
force Laval to sign a collective agreement that had more favourable 
conditions than those in the Posting of Workers Directive. The blockade 
was also a try to force Laval to enter into negotiations on the level of wages 
for the workers. This results, according to the Court, in a big hindrance for 
the free movement of services since it becomes very difficult, if not 
impossible, for foreign companies to know how much they will have to pay 
their workers.68 
 
The Court states that neither of these aims are justifiable and the first 
question is therefore answered as follows: A union cannot use collective 
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action to try to force a company that is posting workers in another member 
state to enter into negotiations regarding wages or to sign a collective 
agreement when it includes provisions that are more favourable than those 
in the Posting of Workers Directive.69 
 
3.2.3.2 Second Question 
The second question is not related to the present case directly, but instead 
asks if the Swedish legislation that states that collective action is prohibited 
only when a company has signed a Swedish collective agreement, , is in 
accordance with EU Law. 
 
It is clear from the Courts previous case law that the free movement of 
services implies a removal of all forms of discrimination based on 
nationality. The definition of discrimination is when different rules are 
applied to the same situation or the same rules are applied to different 
situations. In the present case foreign companies that has signed collective 
agreements, although with foreign unions, are being treated in the same way 
as Swedish companies that have not signed any collective agreement, both 
can be the target for collective actions.70 
 
Such discrimination can be justified if the reason for the discrimination is 
public policy, public security or public health. According to the Court the 
reason for the Swedish legislation is to ensure competitiveness and that 
workers are being paid the same amount that is usual in Sweden. Therefore 
there are no justifiable grounds for the discrimination. The discrimination is 
therefore not in line with community law and the Swedish Law must be 
changed.71 
 
3.2.4 Analysis 
The judgement in the Laval case can be criticised on many points from a 
precariat standpoint. The Posting of Workers Directive seemed to have 
taken the rights of the posted workers into account, but the Court watered 
down the rights for the workers significantly. The directive had balanced the 
aim of the inner market and the possibility to provide services easily in 
another member state against the rights of the workers. The Court focused 
solely on the free movement and removed as many hinders that it possibly 
could. What hade been introduced as a floor of rights was now not only a 
floor, but also a roof of which rights could be demanded through collective 
action. The Court did this despite the fact that the directive says that it 
should not be seen as hinder for more beneficial employment conditions. It 
still does not hinder it, but it hinders the possibility of the workers to attain 
them, which means that the employment conditions outside of the nucleus 
of minimum rights can only be given voluntarily by the companies posting 
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workers. They are therefore no longer rights, but instead they are privileges 
given as gifts from the companies that choose to give them. 
 
The decision of the Court weakens the unions considerably in regards to the 
companies that are posting workers in Sweden. In turn this leads to the 
union being weakened when it comes to protecting the Swedish workers as 
well, since if they demand something the employer does not agree to, the 
employer can easily bring in foreign workers instead of the Swedish ones. 
The result of this is tension between two groups that would benefit from 
uniting instead of competing with each other. The tension was clear during 
the blockade when the Swedish workers shouted “go home” to the Latvian 
workers. The ruling opened up for competition based on a lowering of the 
rights for the workers. If the workers were to unite, they would not have to 
compete with each other by lowering the employment conditions. This 
would presuppose that the Swedish workers and unions would not oppose 
foreign workers since the foreign workers would not have any incentives for 
such an agreement otherwise. 
 
In a situation of posting of workers there will always be some problems to 
solve. There will be some things to resolve when a company from one 
country is trying to establish in another, such as figuring out what wages 
have to be paid. The legislation and the Court decide who will have to carry 
this burden. It could place the burden on the company trying to establish in 
another state, obliging them to follow the regulations in the hosting state, 
even though they might be difficult understanding how to apply them at 
first. The option is to make it as easy as possible for the employers, which 
would mean that the workers would have to carry the burden instead. In this 
case the Court clearly wanted to make it as easy as possible for the 
employers to establish in another state. The Court states that it is almost 
impossible for the companies to find out how much they have to pay the 
workers. In reality it probably would not be that difficult, a phone call to the 
union or bringing in a consultant with experience from the Swedish labour 
market could have solved the problem. This would be an extra effort for the 
companies, although not a major one. Since the burden is lifted from the 
employers it is instead placed on the workers. To make it as easy as possible 
for the companies, the rights of the workers are limited to a minimum, 
which means they have to work in worse employment conditions and get 
less money for it. In the balance of economy and rights, the Court clearly 
favoured the economy. 
 
 
The ruling from the Court also opens up for a treatment of migrant workers 
as second-class workers. For some reason the Court finds it reasonable that 
migrant workers should only be entitled to minimum conditions. This is 
good as a floor, but limiting the possibility of the workers to attain a higher 
level of employment conditions means that workers in Sweden are treated 
differently only because they come from a different country, which of 
course is discrimination.  
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3.3 The Legislation 
3.3.1 Swedish Labour Law 
“The labour law in Sweden has some characteristics that makes it different 
from the labour law in many other countries. To begin with the number of 
workers that are members in a union is very high, even though it has 
dropped from almost 90% to about 70% in the last 15 years. The high 
number of union members has its origin in the early worker’s movement in 
Sweden. In the beginning of the 20th century the movement had more 
power on the labour market than it had politically. Therefore more 
regulation was adopted by agreement between the worker’s and the 
employer’s organisations than in law by politicians. The laws that were 
adopted in the coming decades did not provide many new obligations, but 
merely codified and strengthened the current system. For example there was 
a right of freedom of association and rules about the collective agreement. 
Even in the 70’s when the legislature was active on the area of labour 
legislation, most of the laws were codifying regulations that were already in 
place due to agreements between the parties of the labour market. As an 
example the role of the union representative on the workplace received legal 
protection. 
 
The result of the strong position that the worker’s and the employer’s 
organisations have is that Sweden has relatively few laws regulating the 
labour market and a strong role is played by collective agreements. The fact 
is that Sweden has no law on minimum wage, instead the minimum wage is 
regulated in agreements by the representatives in each sector of the labour 
market. To keep the unions and the collective agreements strong, the unions 
have a wide right to strike, blockade and to take other industrial action. The 
unions even have the right to include members not personally affected by a 
situation in a strike. Through sympathy strike a strike against a minor 
company in a remote area of Sweden can become a nation-wide strike.”72 
 
3.3.2 Lex Britannia 
In 1989 the Swedish Labour court gave a judgement in what is known as the 
Britannia-case. It regarded a collective action that was taken by a Swedish 
union against a ship-owner in order to force the company to sign a Swedish 
collective agreement for its workers. The ship-owner had already signed a 
collective agreement in the Philippines and claimed there was an obligation 
to maintain industrial peace, and that the collective action was unlawful. 
The labour court agreed with the ship-owner and stated that industrial peace 
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was to be maintained when a company has signed a collective agreement, 
even if this agreement is not with a Swedish union.73 
 
The Swedish social democratic government thought that this judgement 
would have a bad effect on the Swedish labour market since collective 
agreements is the main way to protect workers. An alternative would be to 
regulate the labour market with minimum-regulations on such areas as 
wages. The government stated that this is not desirable since the Swedish 
model is working fine. Instead the aim of the legislation should be to 
facilitate for the parties of the labour market to enter into collective 
agreements. The government also said that this model needs to be 
strengthened in order for the unions to be able to protect the workers on a 
future market with more trans-national workers as it was likely that Sweden 
would join the EU in a few years. Therefore it was necessary for changes in 
the law so that companies that are operating in Sweden apply wages and 
employment terms in level with what is customary on the Swedish market.74 
 
The solution was to change the law so that the obligation to maintain 
industrial peace was only applicable when the 1976:580 Employment (Co-
Determination in the Workplace) Act was applicable on the collective 
agreement. The employment act is only applicable on collective agreements 
that have a close connection to Sweden. Meaning that foreign collective 
agreements could be set aside by a Swedish one by the use of collective 
action. Some of the bodies considering the proposed legislation were critical 
of this solution and claimed that it would not live up to the EU regulation if 
Sweden were to enter the EU. The government answered that this would not 
be discriminatory and not in conflict with EU regulations. Alternative 
solutions were suggested, such as that the industrial peace could only be set 
aside when the collective agreements did not meet a certain standard. This 
was completely opposite to Swedish labour law tradition according to the 
government.75 
3.3.3 Proposition 
When the European Court of Justice had given their ruling in the Laval-case 
it was clear that Sweden had to change their legislation and adapt it to EU-
Law. In 2009 the centre-right government presented their proposal for 
change in the legislation, which was also passed as law by the Swedish 
parliament.76 
 
The Government said that the Court had been clear in laying down how 
article 3.7 in the Directive should be interpreted. Article 3.7 in the Directive 
says that the previous regulations in the article are not to be seen as 
preventing conditions of employment that are more favourable for the 
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workers. With the Laval-judgement the Court had said that this was not to 
be interpreted as allowing a demand for more favourable conditions or as 
allowing collective action to attain more favourable conditions. Therefore 
any legislation that allowed such action is in conflict with EU-law. When 
the Directive was incorporated in Swedish law it was interpreted to be a 
minimum requirement and that there was nothing in the Directive that 
prohibited collective action to force a company to accept conditions that 
went beyond those minimum requirements laid down in the directive. The 
Government said that the Court had gone against this interpretation made 
earlier by Sweden, and that it is no longer valid. As a consequence the right 
to take collective action needs to be more limited than it was at the time. 
The Directive now must be seen not only as floor but also as a roof for what 
can be required by a company that are stationing workers in Sweden.77 
 
When coming up with suggestions for changes in the Swedish legislation 
the government had a few premises for their suggestions. The first premise 
was to, to an as far extent as possible, maintain the model of the Swedish 
labour market where the parties of labour market decide the wage levels 
without interference by the government. The second premise was, when the 
EU law allowed for different solutions, to create the best balance possible 
between the relevant interests, namely between a well functioning inner 
market with free movement of services, a sound competition between 
national and international companies on the one side, and a maintaining of 
the Swedish standard when it comes to employment conditions for workers 
stationed in Sweden. The third premise was to follow the international 
conventions that Sweden has ratified, such as various ILO conventions.78 
 
The solution presented by the government was to make changes to, and add 
paragraphs in the Posting of Workers Act79 and the Employment (Co-
Determination in the Workplace) Act80. In the Posting of Workers Act a 
new paragraph (5a) was introduced. It says that collective action is allowed 
only when it is used to achieve employment conditions that are (1) included 
in a central collective agreement, (2) only relating to minimum standards in 
such agreements, and (3) are more favourable than those conditions in law. 
Furthermore such action shall be prohibited if the employer shows that the 
workers already have conditions that are overall as favourable as those in 
the relevant collective agreement. To be able to support claims on a 
collective agreement it should be handed in to the Swedish Work 
Environment Agency (SWEA) according to the new paragraph 9a.81 
 
In the Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act two new 
paragraphs were introduced. Paragraph 41c that says that collective action 
that is taken in conflict with the above mentioned paragraph 5a is unlawful. 
The former exception that said that collective action to push aside a foreign 
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collective agreement was allowed was complemented by an exemption to 
the exemption that says that it is not allowed to use collective action when a 
company is posting a worker in Sweden in accordance with the Posting of 
Workers Act.82 
 
The Swedish government chose this solution since it wanted to keep the 
Swedish model as intact as possible, but still be in accordance with EU-law. 
They said that the directive and the Court had accepted the model by 
opening for the possibility to extend a collective agreement to apply to 
posted workers, at least in the nuclear parts, in article 3.8 of the directive. 
Sweden had not used this opportunity to extend a collective agreement when 
the directive was incorporated in Swedish Law though, which is why 
paragraph 9a in the Posting of Workers Act was necessary. The 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Swedish Agency for 
Government Employers critiqued the solution, stating that the unions had no 
obligation to protect the posted workers, which could mean that the system 
would not offer enough securities for the posted workers. The government 
responded that the unions had incentive enough to perform such control.83 
 
The government further laid down what employment conditions can be 
demanded through collective action. First of all, as mentioned above, it must 
be conditions that are in a central collective agreement that has been handed 
in to the SWEA. It is also limited to the areas in the Directive that has been 
implemented through the Posting of Workers Act, and it can only be 
minimum requirements in such collective agreement. The Posting of 
Workers Act already contains minimum standards on all areas except on 
wages. So the question was if it was possible at all to use collective action to 
demand a company to follow rules on this area. There were three different 
views on this. Stockholm University was of the view that the Laval-case had 
shut the door completely for the use of collective action to demand 
conditions more favourable than those already existing in law. The 
government said that this was still possible since there was a possibility in 
the Directive to extend a collective agreement to apply to stationed workers. 
The unions stated that it was enough to demand a company to live up to the 
regulations in law to take collective action. The government denied this, 
saying that it would be against EU-law to use collective action to demand 
conditions that workers are already entitled to, through, for example, 
legislation. Therefore the conditions demanded must be more favourable 
than those in the posting of workers act.84 
 
The unions stated in their consultation body-answers that it should be 
allowed to take collective action in order to make a company posting 
workers in Sweden sign insurances covering the workers in case of 
accidents, since article 3.1e in the Directive says that the nucleus of 
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conditions covers safety, health and hygiene at the workplace. According to 
the government the Laval-judgement denied this possibility.85 
 
The unions wanted the possibility to force a company to sign a collective 
agreement even when the company lived up to the minimum standards, 
since having a collective agreement is what makes it possible for the union 
to control that a company lives up to the commitments they have made. A 
company that says that they do live up to the minimum standards might as 
well sign a collective agreement to confirm the conditions. The prohibition 
to use collective action should only be applicable when a foreign company 
already has signed a collective agreement in another member state that lives 
up to the minimum standards in Sweden. The government’s response was 
that it would not be in conformity with EU-law since the possibility to 
control companies is not a justifiable reason to make restrictions of the free 
movement of services. The government agrees that it is important that it is 
possible to control the companies in some way, but not through forcing 
them to sign collective agreements through collective action. Instead their 
solution is to make it mandatory for companies posting workers in Sweden 
to prove that they are living up to the minimum requirements by showing 
proper documentation. If they can do that, the unions will have to maintain 
collective peace. The unions opposed this, saying that it will be easy for the 
companies to create fake documentation. The government did not think this 
was a big problem.86 
 
Another critique against Sweden in the Laval-judgement was that it was 
difficult or even close to impossible for Laval to find out what could be 
expected of them in regard of conditions for their workers. To come to 
terms with this it is suggested that the SWEA should be strengthened in its 
role to provide foreign companies with the employment conditions that can 
be demanded from them.87 
 
3.3.3.1 Estimated consequences of the new legislation 
The government made the assessment that the new regulations would not 
have a major impact on the Swedish labour market. They did state though 
that foreign companies would have the competition power improved since 
they could compete with slightly lower wages and that they are more 
protected against collective action than the Swedish companies. The 
government pointed out that the employment organisation in the 
construction sector had 56 foreign companies as members and they were 
already bound to follow the collective agreement and he law would, thus, 
have no effect on them. The government failed to mention that this might 
have been because they were afraid to face collective action if they would 
not have signed.88 
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In a Swedish Government Official Report that was published ahead of the 
preparatory works and used as a basis for the government proposition the 
parties of the labour market gave their views on the estimated consequences 
the new legislation would have. The unions gave voice to grave concerns on 
what would happen on the Swedish labour market if the law would pass. 
They said that if foreign companies posting workers in Sweden would only 
pay the minimum wages in the collective agreements instead of the general 
wages the economic and social tension would be serious and it would have a 
big impact on the wages of the Swedish workers.89 
 
The employers’ organisations were not worried of such a development 
saying that it would be no problem as long as the minimum wages were 
actually followed. They also stated that there might be more competition 
from foreign companies that would be given a slight advantage, but that 
such a development was desired, even if it meant some wage-competition. 
The committee drafting the report did not take a stand regarding the effects, 
but instead said that according to national economic theories it could have 
some socioeconomic gains, but that it could also have bad effects for the 
workers that are exposed to the competition.90 
 
3.3.4 Analysis 
In the end of the 80’s the social democratic government hindered the growth 
of the precariat when they strengthened the unions after they had been 
weakened by the decision in the Swedish labour court. One of the aspects 
that are contributing to the creation of the precariat is the weakening of 
collective bodies, since they restrict the free reign of the market. Therefore it 
was an important legislation made by the government that empowered the 
unions to keep their function of protecting workers on Swedish territory 
even in a time of more globalisation. 
 
The effort was nullified by the judgement in the Laval-case, and the 
Swedish government was forced to change the Swedish legislation. The 
government still had a few different possibilities on how to adjust the 
Swedish legislation to be in accordance with EU-law, which makes it 
worthy of an analysis. 
 
One of the things that the government did, and did well, was to create an 
administrative way for foreign companies to find out the employment 
conditions they are bound to follow. The government stopped a little short 
though, they could have made it mandatory for the unions to hand in all 
collective agreements, and prescribed the SWEA to gather them. This 
solution could have meant that the question of who is to carry the burden of 
the aspiration for free movement on services, the companies or the workers, 
could have been solved by the government taking the burden, by making it 
                                                
89 SOU 2008:123 p. 341-342. 
90 SOU 2008:123 p. 342. 
 33 
easy for foreign companies by providing information of the conditions they 
were expected to apply to its workers. Unfortunately the Laval-case also 
meant that only the minimum conditions in the agreements could be 
demanded through collective action. Which means that the workers still 
have to carry the burden. 
 
When it comes to how the working conditions for the posted workers are to 
be controlled without collective agreements being in place on a labour 
market where such agreements play an essential role, it can seem like the 
unions were empowered. The government gave this task to the unions in 
order to respect the Swedish model, but they failed to give them the tools to 
do so. The new law states that it is enough for the companies posting 
workers in Sweden to show some form of documentation that they are 
applying the minimum standards to be safeguarded from collective action. It 
is near to impossible for the unions to control if this documentation is 
actually true. The result is an even more weakened union in regard to the 
foreign companies and that the posted workers are protected neither by the 
unions or the government. Just like the EU Court the Swedish government 
treat the foreign workers as second-class workers not entitled to the 
protection and the rights that Swedish workers have. The legislation, just 
like the Laval-case, is discriminatory, not towards the companies, but 
towards the workers. 
 
The Swedish government also changed the Lex Britannia legislation more 
than was necessary. The essence of Lex Britannia was that Swedish unions 
could use collective action to push aside foreign collective agreements. This 
was seen as discriminatory since foreign companies was treated differently 
from the Swedish companies that had signed collective agreements. The 
logical change of legislation would have been to state that foreign 
companies that have signed collective agreement in their home country are 
protected from collective action. Instead the new legislation states that it is 
enough for the foreign companies to live up to minimum conditions in the 
relevant collective agreement in order to be protected from collective action. 
Thus, it is not necessary for the companies posting workers to sign 
collective agreements in their home countries, which weakens the position 
for both the Swedish unions and the unions in the companies country of 
origin. It also has a negative effect for the posted workers when their 
employer easily can avoid signing collective agreements. Through this the 
government clearly favoured the possibility for companies to establish in 
other member states over the protection of workers. 
 
The statement from the government that many companies had become 
members of employers’ organisations, which means they are bound by 
collective agreements anyway and that the new legislation would not have a 
very big impact is very questionable. The government assumes that these 
companies became members voluntarily and was not affected at all by the 
possibility of collective action being taken against them if they would not 
join such an organisation. It is also remarkable that both the government and 
the employers’ organisations expects wage competition, but sees no actual 
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problems with it. The government says that there probably will be 
competition from companies applying “slightly lower wages”. In the Laval-
case Byggnads wanted the workers to have 145 SEK/h, Laval refused to 
accept anything above 109 SEK/h. The slightly lower wages could thus 
mean a 25 % decrease in the wage level. 
 
 
 
3.4 The effects of the case and the 
legislation 
3.4.1 The situation for posted workers in 
Sweden 
Landsorganisationen, LO, the Swedish trade union confederation for 
workers in the traditional “working class” sectors, presented a report in 
2013 in which they had mapped the posting of workers within their sectors. 
They did so by sending out a questionnaire to the local departments of their 
organisation. LO said themselves that it is very difficult to make a 100% 
correct assessment of the number of posted workers, but believe that they 
did not over-estimate it, rather the other way around.91 
 
The survey showed that posting of workers is most common in sectors 
where there is a high use of contractors and sub-contractors, such as 
construction, transportation, farming and forestry. LO claim that there are 
various reasons for the use of posted workers. In some cases it is due to a 
shortage of qualified workers, but in construction and forestry one of the big 
reasons are wage competition. Those two sectors are also those where the 
most posting of workers occurs. The survey showed that there were about 
15’000 posted workers in the construction sector compared to almost 80 000 
members in Byggnads. In the forestry sector the posted workers make up for 
about 10% of the workforce.92 
 
The numbers are contested though, Sveriges Byggindustrier, the employers’ 
organisation in the construction sector, presented their own report, written 
by a consulting group. They estimated the number of posted workers to be 
8900 per year. A number they got by visiting 42 construction sites (selected 
by Sveriges Byggindustrier) and counting the number of posted workers at 
these sites, calculating the percentage of posted of workers and then 
multiplying the number by the total number of construction workers in 
Sweden.93 
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In 2013 a new law was introduced that obliges companies posting workers 
in Sweden to register that they are doing so to the SWEA94. Their statistics 
show that the number of posted workers has varied from about 700095 to 10 
000 workers in the last year96. The difference between the numbers 
estimated by LO and the registered number can have several reasons. It 
could be that not all companies actually register their posted workers, due to 
large infrastructure projects at the time of the report, or it is just bad 
estimates. When asked about the number of posted workers in the 
construction sector an employee at the SWEA said, “I have no clue, I’m 
asking myself if anyone can know that so far”97. It is, thus, very difficult to 
get an exact number. 
 
Since the judgement in the Laval-case there has been no collective action 
taken by a union member in the LO against a company regarding posted 
workers. The authors of the report cannot say for certain why this is. One 
reason is that many companies demand that the contractors sign collective 
agreements. Another more negative reason is that it is very hard for the 
unions to make sure that they have the right to take collective action. 
According to the new legislation it is enough for the foreign companies to 
show that they are living up to the minimum employment conditions to 
avoid collective actions. When representatives from the unions have 
contacted the companies, they have responded that they live up to the set 
minimum standard. Sometimes this has been proven with proper 
documentation, but other times with self-made documents or just orally. It is 
very difficult for the unions to validate the documentation. The local offices 
replying to the survey is of the understanding that many of the posting 
companies have fake contracts that they show to the unions. Another 
difficulty is that very few of the posted workers become members in the 
unions, which makes it harder for the unions to control that the contracts are 
actually being followed. An understanding among the local branches of the 
unions is that the posting companies has learned that they should sign 
collective agreements, but knows that there is no one that has the possibility 
to make sure they actually follow them. The result has been that they sign 
collective agreements but forbid their workers to have any contact with the 
unions. If they do they are being sent home. Another difficulty is more of an 
economic one. The unions are weakened due to the fact that they have to 
spend money (for example on translators), resources and time to control the 
compliance of the agreements.98  
 
The new order where unions have limited possibilities to do their part on the 
labour market for posted workers has resulted in unfair competition from 
foreign companies that can win public procurements due to the possibility to 
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pay lower wages. In a study made by LO that reviewed three infrastructure 
projects by visits to the workplaces and interviews with workers that had 
returned home to the sending state, it was shown that the wage level for the 
posted workers were 55-80% of that of the Swedish workers. The wage gap 
between Swedish workers and posted workers was increased due to some 
companies making reductions on the wages to pay for travels and 
accommodation during the posting. To do so is a violation of the Posting of 
Workers Directive. Interviews with construction workers from Poland that 
had been posted to these projects revealed that many posted workers worked 
more than the Swedish for that money. In some cases the posted workers 
worked up to 230 hours per month with no over-time compensation.99 
 
A posted worker interviewed by Sveriges byggindustrier is more positive 
regarding the situation for the posted workers. The wage is much better than 
in his home country and the workplace is more secure.100 
 
In the report from Sveriges Byggindustrier they looked at all available cases 
from the Stockholm first instance court and the Labour court. In the first 
instance court, which is the instance responsible for work related disputes 
when the worker is not a member of a union, there were no disputes 
regarding posted workers. In the Labour court there was only one dispute 
related to posted workers in 2013. The conclusion from this in the report is 
that there are no problems regarding the labour standards for the posted 
workers. Another sign of this, according to the report, is that there have 
been no local disputes between unions and foreign companies since 2009.101 
 
Sveriges Byggindustrier also interviewed actors with different roles and 
interests in the issue (none representing the unions). The asked102 said that 
there were no problems for posted workers in the companies connected to 
Sveriges Byggindustrier, but only to smaller, less serious companies that 
have not signed collective agreements and that the overall problems for 
posted workers are diminishing. However, some of the interviewed stated 
that there are problems for the posted workers. Working time and safety 
issues were specifically mentioned. The posted workers have an interest of 
working long hours because they are only abroad to earn as much as 
possible and then have a longer period of time back home. The posted 
worker in the report was working 12 hour-days six days a week for three 
weeks and then had one week off when he could go home. The safety issue 
specifically mentioned was that posted workers were working on heights 
with no security. The suggested reasons from the interviewed regarding 
safety issues were cultural background, language and education.103  
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In the report from Sveriges Byggindustrier the interviewed are also asked 
about the role of the unions. It is said that much of the work to control that 
laws are followed is up to the unions. This is due to a lack of resources for 
the government agencies. At the same time it is difficult for the unions to 
get access to the workplaces. The unions are critiqued for focusing to much 
on workplaces that are easy to access and already have a well built union 
organisation, and for not handing in their collective agreements to the 
SWEA, which would make it easier for foreign companies to know what is 
expected of them. It is also stated that many posted workers are not 
members in any union and that this could be because they are afraid to speak 
with the unions, since they risk their job if the do so. The incentive for the 
posted workers to join the union is also limited if the unions are too focused 
on raising their wages, since this would make it harder for them to compete 
with the Swedish workers. Another reason that is given is that the unions 
have a bad reputation since it was their actions in the Laval-case that forced 
the workers to go home.104 
 
3.4.2 Critique from international bodies 
3.4.2.1 ILO 
In 2013 ILO’s Committee of Experts (the Committee) critiqued Sweden for 
the Lex Laval legislation. The issue was raised before the Committee by the 
Swedish unions, stating that it was in violation of ILO Convention 87 on 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. The 
concerns raised by the unions was that it is very difficult for the unions in 
advance to know what is lawful and what is not when it comes to taking 
industrial action. This can be seen by the fact that no industrial action has 
been taken against a foreign company since the Laval-case and the 
following legislation. The result, according to the unions, has been a fall in 
the number of collective agreements, which in turn means that the foreign 
workers are less protected and that the Swedish workers faces competition 
from workers with fewer right and much lower wages. What is especially 
concerning for the unions is the fact that they are prohibited to take 
collective action against a foreign company, regardless if the company has 
signed a collective agreement or not, as long as the company live up to the 
minimum standard according to the posting of workers directive.105 
 
The employers’ organisations state that the free movement is a vital part of 
the European Union that will benefit all. Furthermore they state that it is still 
possible for workers and employers to enter into agreement voluntarily and 
that it is now much easier and more foreseeable for foreign companies to 
                                                
104 PA Consulting Group (2014), pp 26-28. 
105 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, Report III (Part 1A), International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 
2013, pp. 176, 178. [cited as: ILO Committee of Experts (2013)] 
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work in Sweden since they now know how much they are obliged to pay 
their employees.106 
 
The Committee raises concern of the fact that the unions are prohibited to 
take collective action against a foreign employer, even if the workers are 
members of a union. This means that the nationality of the company decides 
which rights a union has to take industrial action in order to protect their 
members. For that reason the Committee requests the government to review 
the legislation to enable the unions to have better possibilities to protect 
their members.107 
 
 
3.4.2.2 European Social Committee 
The unions also filed a complaint to the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) who is the complaint mechanism for the European Social 
Charter (ESC) raising mostly the same complaints as they did to the ILO 
Committee of Experts. In sum that the Swedish legislation is an 
infringement of the unions right to take collective action against a foreign 
company posting workers in Sweden. Stating that unions in Sweden are 
obliged to accept collective agreements that have lower standards of wages 
and protection than the collective agreement of the Swedish workers. This 
leads to worsened employment conditions for Swedish workers and it has 
also resulted in that a lot fewer collective agreements have been signed. In 
2007 107 agreements were signed, in 2010 only 27. It has also had the effect 
that no collective action has been taken against a foreign company since 
2007. In this case they state it is a violation of Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the 
ESC, which says that the state should promote collective agreements and 
recognise the right to take collective action. They also state that this is a 
violation of article 19:a-b of the ESC that says that migrant workers 
lawfully within the territory of a state shall have a treatment not less 
favourable than nationals when it comes to remuneration, working 
conditions, membership of trade unions and collective bargaining.108 
 
The government responded that the Lex Laval legislation was necessary in 
order to be in compliance with EU legislation. It also states that the 
possibility to sign a collective agreement voluntarily still exists.109 
 
The ECSR begins by pointing out that the right to bargaining collectively 
and to take collective action is fundamental in order to ensure other rights in 
the ESC, such as working conditions and protection in cases of termination 
of employment. The ECSR also states that the legislation results in 
substantial limitations for the trade unions when it comes to taking 
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107 ILO Committee of Experts (2013), pp 176, 178-179. 
108 European Committee of Social Rights, Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v. Sweden, Complaint No. 
85/2012, para. 79-97, 126-130. [cited as: European Committee of Social Rights (2012)] 
109 European Committee of Social Rights (2012), para 98-99. 
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collective action. When it comes to the posted workers the Swedish 
legislation does not promote collective agreements and are therefore in 
violation of article 6.2 of the ESC. Regarding the right to take collective 
action the ESC opens up to limitations of the right as long as it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The ECSR states that: 
 
“legal rules relating to the exercise of economic freedoms established 
by State Parties either directly through national law or indirectly 
through EU law should be interpreted in such a way as to not impose 
disproportionate restrictions upon the exercise of labour rights as set 
forth by, further to the Charter, national laws, EU law, and other 
international binding standards. In particular, national and EU rules 
regulating the enjoyment of such freedoms should be interpreted and 
applied in a manner that recognises the fundamental importance of 
the right of trade unions and their members to strive both for the 
protection and the improvement of the living and working conditions 
of workers, and also to seek equal treatment of workers regardless of 
nationality or any other ground.”110 
 
” Consequently, the facilitation of free cross-border movement of 
services and the promotion of the freedom of an employer or 
undertaking to provide services in the territory of other States […] 
cannot be treated, from the point of view of the system of values, 
principles and fundamental rights embodied in the Charter, as having 
a greater a priori value than core labour rights, including the right to 
make use of collective action to demand further and better protection 
of the economic and social rights and interests of workers.”111 
 
The ECSR states that the restrictions on the unions to take collective action 
when an employer can show that the workers employment conditions that 
are as favourable as the minimum standards in a central collective 
agreement are disproportionate and therefore a violation of article 6 of the 
ESC. It is also a violation of Article 19 since Sweden does not protect the 
foreign workers in the same way as they protect the Swedish workers.112 
 
 
3.4.3 Analysis 
When looking at the consequences of the Lex Laval legislation it must first 
be noticed that there is a lack of objective facts. The available reports are 
produced either by the unions or by the employers’ organisations, and they 
give two different pictures of the situation. This in itself says something 
about the legislation. The unions are critical and want a change, the 
employers’ organisations think the legislation has had mostly positive 
effects. From this it can be concluded that Lex Laval is a piece of legislation 
that favours the employers and not the unions. 
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The two sides do agree on certain things, one of these is that there has been 
no collective action against a company posting workers in Sweden since the 
new legislation entered into force. However, they do not agree on how to 
understand this. The employers state that this shows that there are no 
problems on the Swedish labour market. The unions mean that this is due to 
the new legislation, which has taken away the right to take collective action. 
The ILO committee of experts agree with the unions. From a precariat point 
of view this is of course very serious. It means that today there is a large 
group of workers that has no possibility to make collective demands. Both 
the unions and the posted workers have been weakened. 
 
According to the employers another fact that shows that the situation is 
good on the labour market is that there has been very few individual cases 
regarding posted workers. This is a conclusion that makes it difficult to take 
the report seriously. What it shows is that the posted workers have limited 
possibilities to bring their claims to a court. The report from the employers 
says that the posted workers might be scared of talking to the unions, how 
much more so when it comes to bringing a case to the court? Again this 
shows that the posted workers have limited rights compared to their 
Swedish colleagues. 
 
Another aspect that makes it hard to take the report seriously is that it states 
that it is in the workers interest to work long hours when they are in Sweden 
in order to be able be home for a longer period of time. It then shamelessly 
moves on to informing that the posted worker in the report works 12 hours 
per day, six days a week when he is in Sweden, but then have a whole week 
of. This amounts to 54 hours of work per week, including the week off. This 
shows an ignorance of the situation for the posted workers.  
 
The employers’ report does lift one interesting aspect on why the posted 
workers are not members of the union in the same extent as the Swedish 
workers. It could be because of the unions actions towards Laval. The effect 
for the Latvian workers was that they became unemployed due to the 
blockade against the construction site. It could also be because they want to 
be able to compete with their wages against the Swedish workers. This 
raises the question if the Swedish unions actually are not so concerned by 
the situation for the posted workers, that their aim actually is to protect the 
Swedish workers from competition. Standing says that this is a problem 
with the unions and this is the reason he proposes a new form of collective 
bodies that protect everyone in the Precariat, not only those that are in stable 
employment. 
 
What is positive from a precariat standpoint is that the European Committee 
of Social Rights makes a clear statement that the free movement of services 
cannot have a higher priority than labour rights. According to Standing the 
prioritization of free movement and economy over rights is one of the key 
reasons for the growing of the precariat, a prioritization that needs to be 
reversed. 
 41 
 
 
3.5 Proposed legislative changes in 
regard to the posted workers 
3.5.1 Introduction 
In 2014 the EU passed a directive on how the Posting of Workers Directive 
shall be enforced113 (hereinafter: the Enforcement Directive) In a response 
to the Enforcement Directive the Swedish government appointed a 
committee to inquire how to implement the new directive in Swedish 
legislation. To begin with the committee was not to investigate the 
possibility to implement an entrepreneurial responsibility or better access to 
information regarding collective agreements, since the centre-right 
government did not desire this. When the left wing government won the 
election in September 2014 they broadened the scope of the inquiry to 
include those aspects as well.114 
 
Among the original instructions to the committee one of the tasks was to 
investigate how the rights of posted workers could be strengthened. This 
will also be covered in this chapter.115 
3.5.2 Responsibility for contractors 
Article 12 in the Enforcement Directive opens up for the possibility to 
introduce a solidary responsibility for all contractors and sub-contractors in 
regard to the workers. One of the reasons for such a possibility is that it is 
especially important to protect workers’ rights in such chains. The 
Committee on the Labour Market had already identified this problem in 
2012. It stated that the Swedish model generally worked well but that there 
were some difficulties to make sure that posted workers in longer chains of 
sub contractors were paid, sometimes due to the fact that it was hard to 
distinguish who was the actual employer.116 
 
The proposed change is to introduce a responsibility for all entrepreneurs in 
a chain from the original contractor to the actual employer. The parties of 
the labour market were asked what they thought about the suggestion. Not 
surprisingly the unions thought that the responsibility should be as wide as 
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2015, pp. 33-35 [cited as: SOU 2015:38] 
115 SOU 2015:13, Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – del I, Stockholm, 
2015, pp. 53-55. [cited as: SOU 2015:13] 
116 SOU 2015:38, pp 77-80. 
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possible, which means that the solidarity should cover all the sub-
contractors, not only the one contracting the employer. Even the main 
contractor can have responsibility for an employee furthest down in the 
chain. It also means that the contractors have a strict responsibility. The 
contractors can thus not avoid responsibility by taking reasonable control 
measures. The employers’ organisations, of course, thought the opposite. 
First of all they did not think there should be such a responsibility at all, and 
if so it should only be relevant for the company hiring the employing 
company, one step in the chain that is. They also wanted a possibility to 
avoid responsibility by taking reasonable actions to hire serious and 
responsible sub-contractors.117 
 
The committee agreed with the unions and suggested a strict entrepreneurial 
responsibility that covers all the entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial chain. 
They stated that such a responsibility would lead to self-sanitation in 
business, since contractors would have to be more careful in their selection 
of contractors in order to avoid additional costs at a later stage.118 
 
The reason for the responsibility to be strict is that if there were no such 
responsibility it would be more difficult, more uncertain and take longer 
time for the worker to receive his or her wages. The committee states that 
the strict responsibility is a big disadvantage for the contractors, but it is 
more important to protect the workers in this case. It is also the contractor 
that has the possibility to decide what sub-contractors to hire, which give 
them more control, and therefore more responsibility, over the situation.119 
 
The committee makes an analysis of what effects the proposed legislation 
would have. It states that this change would have a positive effect for the 
posted workers, since it gives them another possibility to claim the rights 
they are entitled to. A more causal effect is that the change will lead to a 
more difficult market for irresponsible companies, which in turn would lead 
to safer workplaces and a lessened risk for the workers. The proposed 
changes would affect all contractors on the Swedish market, both national 
and international ones. The companies would have to spend resources on 
administration to evaluate the contractors they are thinking of hiring, in 
order to avoid having to pay wages for a worker employed by a sub-
contractor. The positive effect of this is that serious companies would 
outrival less serious ones, but it could also lead to smaller companies having 
a harder time entering the market, since they don’t have the resources to 
control sub-contractors.120 
3.5.3 Better access to information 
In the implementation directive article 5.4 it says that the employment 
conditions that relates to article 3 in the posting of workers directive shall be 
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accessible for foreign companies. The parties of the labour market shall be 
involved to make the conditions available to foreign companies. The 
conditions should at least include the relevant wages the companies can be 
expected to pay.121   
 
The above mentioned information was partly introduced after the Laval-case 
(see något kapitelnummer), but the changes did not have the desired effect. 
Very few collective agreements were handed in to the SWEA. The 
committee therefore proposes a change in the legislation that will clarify 
that unions have an obligation to hand in collective agreements. The unions 
are also obligated to assign a contact person that can provide information 
of conditions to companies interested in posting workers in Sweden.122 
 
The unions were against introducing an obligation to hand in collective 
agreements since it would be an infringement on the Swedish model. The 
collective agreements should only be between the parties of the labour 
market. Instead they supported the proposition to introduce a contact person. 
The employers’ representatives stated that it was inappropriate for someone 
with a partisan interest to exercise public authority. Especially so when there 
is a disagreement between the parties about the level of minimum wages.123 
 
The committee estimates that the improved access to information regarding 
the employment conditions would benefit the workers. It would make it 
easier for them to know their rights, which in turn would make it easier for 
them to claim their rights. It would also benefit the foreign companies that 
want to enter the Swedish market, since it would be easier for them to know 
what is expected of them. In turn this would benefit the free movement of 
services on the inner market. The unions would have to spend some 
resources to have a contact person available to answer questions from 
companies and workers.124 
 
3.5.4 An extended possibility to use collective 
action 
When the social democrats won the election in the fall of 2014 they issued 
an order to a committee to investigate how the role of the collective 
agreements can be strengthened in the area of posted workers. The 
government stated that the Lex Laval legislation has serious errors that open 
up for competition through lower wages and worse employment conditions. 
One example of possible action that the committee was to investigate was 
the possibility for unions to use collective action to force a company posting 
workers in Sweden to sign a confirmation agreement. Confirmation 
agreements could be used when companies state that they are applying 
                                                
121 SOU 2015:38, pp 56.  
122 SOU 2015:38, p 62. 
123 SOU 2015:38, pp 63, 67. 
124 SOU 2015:38, pp 170-171, 186. 
 44 
conditions that live up to the minimum threshold. Today it is difficult for the 
unions to control that this is really the case, and monitor the actual 
application of the conditions. The deadline for the report is 31th May 2015 
and was not published at the deadline of this thesis.125 
 
3.5.5 Analysis 
How do these changes correspond with the theory of the precariat? The 
solidary responsibility for all sub-contractors is a change that clearly puts a 
new burden on the employers and creates a wider possibility for workers to 
claim rights. This can be seen as a slight shift in policy from both the EU 
and the Swedish government. It seems like they are not so scared of laying 
burdens on the employers in order to protect the workers. Previously this 
would have been regarded as a hindrance for the free movement of services 
on the inner market. It can still be questioned how much it will help the 
posted workers since they probably still have the fear of bring charges to a 
court. 
 
With the proposal regarding the access to information the government 
corrects the flaws in the original legislation regarding access to information. 
It is now mandatory to hand in all collective agreements and there is a clear 
procedure on how to access them. To provide information is good since it 
both promotes free movement and protects workers’ rights. It also put a bit 
of a burden on the unions, but they have the more interest in the system and 
it is therefore justified.  
 
The proposition that unions can have the possibility to use collective action 
to get the foreign companies to sign confirmation agreements is the one that 
would have the most effect. It is unclear if this is in line with EU-law, but 
that is outside the scope of this thesis. It would definitely strengthen the 
position of the unions, even though they would still not be able to force the 
foreign companies to apply the same employment conditions as the Swedish 
ones. From a precariat point of view it can be questioned if this stronger role 
of the union is desirable since one effect could be that foreign companies, 
and the foreign workers will be shut off from the Swedish labour market. 
This would not be a beneficial outcome for the posted workers, and those 
that hope to have the possibility to work in Sweden. 
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4 Conclusion 
According to Standing’s theory there are a few major reasons for the 
growing of a new precariat-class. The main one is the political agenda that 
favours economic interest above workers’ security and protection. Another 
is that, due to globalisation, migrant workers changes the dynamics on the 
labour markets to which they come. In the European Union this change of 
the labour market has been driven by the vision and political goal of the 
inner market, where goods and services can move freely between the 
member states. With the tearing down of much of the inner market border 
control, more workers from foreign countries within the union entered 
Sweden. This raised questions on how to uphold the labour rights and the 
Swedish model in this new time when free movement of services demands 
as few hindrances as possible.  
 
The Social Democrats and the centre-right coalition have handled the clash 
between the Swedish labour rights system and the free movement of the 
inner market differently. Already five years ahead of the national 
referendum on if Sweden was to join the EU or not the Social Democrats 
strengthened the Swedish model by the Lex Britannia legislation. By this 
the Government took a stand for labour rights over the economic interests. 
They were critiqued for creating a law that would not be in conformity with 
the EU law, but their assessment was that it would not be a problem. 
 
The centre-right government did not have the luxury of making assessments, 
they faced a judgement from the European Court of Justice that clearly 
stated that Swedish law was not in line with EU law. The government had to 
change the legislation and they were forced to weaken the protection for the 
unions and the protection for the posted workers. Undoubtedly that was the 
result of the Lex Laval legislation. The government should not be blamed 
too much for this though, since they were forced to do so by the EU. What 
the government can be criticised for is that they went further than the 
judgement forced it to do. The judgement stated that the foreign companies 
were being discriminated because those with collective agreement were in a 
worse position than the Swedish companies that had signed collective 
agreements. It did not say anything about the foreign companies that had not 
signed any collective agreements in their member states. The EU law and 
the Court’s interpretation of it shows a policy that favours economic 
interests by creating a roof of what rights can be claimed by unions, in order 
to make it easier for companies to establish in other member states. The 
government’s creation of Lex Laval shows a policy that favours economic 
interests by weakening the unions even more than the Court did. 
 
The other main aspect of the creation of a precariat class that I have chosen 
to focus on in this thesis is the role of and the situation for the migrant 
workers. In his theory, Standing points out the double nature of the migrant 
workers. They are contributing to the precarious working conditions by 
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creating an overflow of workers and being prepared to work for lower 
wages and worse conditions than the national workers. At the same time 
they are the ones in the precariat that suffers the most, since they often do 
not have much of a choice other than moving abroad to find work, and in 
order to compete on the market they have to accept conditions no citizen 
would accept. They are also facing discrimination since governments want 
to protect the jobs for their own workers. It is also very difficult for them to 
make themselves heard, since contacting the union and bringing claims to 
court could mean a one-way ticket home. 
 
Lex Laval is a legislation that put the posted workers both in a better and a 
worse situation at the same time. It is better since it is now fully legal to use 
posted workers in order to lower the wage costs. This puts the posted 
workers in a good position to compete with the Swedish citizens. The 
negative side is that they are competing with their wages and their 
employment conditions. Lex Laval also mean that the posted workers can 
count on being protected by the unions since they have been limited to 
demand much from the companies regarding the posted workers. They will 
have to accept the situation that they are second-class workers on Swedish 
market. Even if they are as competent as the ones they are competing with, 
they will not receive the same pay, protection or, in the long run, access to 
the justice system. This can be seen from the fact that there has been no 
collective action against companies posting workers in Sweden or no cases 
brought before the Swedish labour court regarding the situation for a posted 
worker.  
 
To sum up, Lex Laval is a law that follows a policy that favours economic 
interests over the worker’s security, it weakens the unions, it creates a 
market with wage competition between workers and it treats the posted 
workers as second-class workers. All of these are key ingredients in the 
creating of a precariat and it is thus a legislation that adds to the creation of 
a precariat. 
 
4.1 Can the trend be reversed? 
The proposed legislative changes are trying to reverse the effects of the Lex 
Laval legislation. The Social Democrats have been protesting against the 
law ever since it was proposed. Now that they are in power they will do 
what they can to change it. The proposed changes do have a different 
perspective than Lex Laval had. There is not the same kind of reluctance to 
impose burdens on the companies in order to protect the workers. The scale 
with the economic interests and the workers’ security is more balanced. This 
is also due to the Implementation Directive which has the aim of protecting 
the workers to a greater extent than the original Posting of Workers 
Directive did, at least compared to how it was interpreted by the Court. The 
proposed changes strengthen the unions and create more securities for the 
posted workers.  
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Some of the main issues still remain untouched though. The unions still will 
not have the same possibilities to take collective action to protect the posted 
workers, and the posted workers will therefore still not be entitled to the 
same level of wages and other employment conditions. The labour market 
will therefore still be divided between cheap foreign labour and more 
expensive Swedish labour, and the competition based on wages and 
lowering of employment conditions will remain. 
 
According to Standing the strengthening of the unions is not the way to help 
those in the precariat. He states that the unions are designed to protect those 
already in stable long term jobs and that a new kind of organisation is 
needed to protect the precariat. In the case of Sweden I both agree and 
disagree with him. I think that the Swedish unions have shown that they not 
only protect their own and their jobs, but also that they are taking a real 
interest in the posted workers and the conditions they work and live under 
while they are here. Therefore I disagree with him regarding the focus of the 
unions, but I agree that the unions need to be supplemented by more efforts. 
In Sweden the government has tried to stay away as much as possible since 
the Swedish model is based on an extensive freedom and responsibility for 
the parties of the labour market. Maybe it is time for the government to take 
a more active approach when it comes to the posted workers, with more 
inspections as a suitable first step, not only regarding security but also 
contractual matters such as correct wages actually being paid out, instead of 
outsourcing the task to the unions. This might be seen as an infringement on 
the Swedish model, but in a time when the Swedish labour market is only a 
part of the European labour market Sweden might need to have a more 
European model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
Bibliography 
Arbetsmiljöverket, Månadsstatistik från utstationeringsregistret per den 1 
april 2015. 
 
Blomberg, Fredrik, The right of access to justice for foreign workers in 
Sweden, 2015. Lunds University 
 
Den osvenska modellen, SVT, aired 5th June, 2014. [available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_L2pBsBHsc] 
 
Jonsson, Claes-Mikael, Larsson, Göran, Gäst i verkligheten – om 
utstationerad arbetskraft i praktiken, Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 2013. 
[cited as: Jonsson & Larsson (2013)] 
 
Jonsson, Claes Mikael, När arbetskraftskostnaderna pressar priset – en 
genomlysning av offentliga investeringar i infrastruktur. 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 2010. 
 
Petterson, Lars-Olof, Vitbok Laval – Vad hände egentligen i Vaxholm, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetarförbundet. 2012. [cited as: Petterson (2012)] 
 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, Report III (Part 1A), International Labour Conference, 
102nd Session, 2013. [cited as: ILO Committee of Experts (2013)] 
 
Standing, Guy, The precariat: the new dangerous class, London, Blomsbury 
Academic, 2011. [cited as: Standing (2011)] 
 
Standing, Guy, A Precariat Charter: From denizens to citizens, London, 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. [cited as: Standing (2014)] 
 
Statistics Sweden, Trends for persons in temporary employment, AM 110 
SM 1501, 2015. 
 
http://www.guystanding.com/resume [accessed February 10th 2015] 
 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm 
[accessed May 26th 2015] 
 
Public sources 
 
Conosolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
2006, O.J. C 321 E/37. 
 
Dir 2014:149, Tillägsdirektiv till Utstationeringskommittén (A 2012:03) 
 
 49 
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services 
 
Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of servicesand amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative co-operation through the 
Internal Market Information System. 
 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services (92/C 49/12) 
 
Proposition 1990/91:162 om vissa fredspliktsregler 
 
Proposition 2009/10:48, Åtgärder med anledning av Lavaldomen 
 
SFS 1976:580 Lag om medbestämmande i arbetslivet 
 
SFS 1999:678 Lag om utstationering av arbetstagare 
 
SOU 2008:123 Förslag till ändringar med anledning av Lavaldomen 
 
SOU 2015:13, Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – del I, 
Stockholm, 2015. 
 
SOU 2015:38, Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – del II, 
Stockholm, 2015. 
 
 
 50 
Table of Cases 
 
AD 1989 nr 120 
 
AD 2009 nr 89 
 
Case C-341/05 Laval un Partnieri [2007] ECR I-11845 
 
European Committee of Social Rights, Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
(LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v. 
Sweden, Complaint No. 85/2012. [cited as: European Committe of Social 
Rights (2012)] 
 
